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Case No. 20180016-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

MATTHEW GORDON EYRE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and two friends tried to steal Victim’s car. For his
participation in the attempted carjacking, Defendant was charged with
aggravated robbery as an accomplice.
At trial, the jury was instructed on aggravated robbery and given three
accomplice liability instructions: a statutory instruction, an elements
instruction, and a definition instruction.
The jury also viewed Defendant’s videotaped police interview. In the
video, Defendant told different stories of what happened but also appeared
cooperative with the detective, remorseful, and consistently stated that he did
not have a gun during the attempted robbery. The jury was allowed to take

the video to the jury room during its deliberations. Defense counsel did not
object. After the jury had the video for about twenty minutes, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial based on the jury having access to the video during
deliberations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that no prejudice
resulted because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
guilty verdict.
On appeal, Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to one of the three accomplice liability instructions—the elements
instruction—Instruction 40. To prevail, Defendant must prove both deficient
performance and prejudice. Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim fails.
Defendant cannot show his counsel performed deficiently because competent
counsel could have reasonably concluded that Instruction 40 adequately
conveyed the correct mental state alone or when read with the other
instructions. For this same reason, Defendant cannot show prejudice. He also
cannot show prejudice because ample evidence supported the jury’s verdict.
Defendant also argues that the video of his police interview should not
have gone back to the jury room during deliberations. Defendant first argues
his claim as though it had been preserved by a motion for mistrial made after
the jury re-watched the video; alternatively, Defendant argues that his
counsel was ineffective. But Defendant’s after-the-fact mistrial motion did

-2-

not suffice to preserve an objection to the jury re-watching the video during
its deliberations. Accordingly, Defendant can prevail only if he proves that
his counsel was ineffective. Because Defendant cannot prove either element,
of his ineffectiveness claim, it necessarily fails. He cannot show prejudice
because ample evidence supports that he intended to aid Rakes in the
attempted carjacking and his arguments as to the impact of the video on the
jury’s deliberations are purely speculative. Nor can Defendant show that no
competent counsel would have allowed the jury to have access to the video
during deliberations because the video was the only evidence of Defendant’s
story.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Has Defendant established that his trial counsel was ineffective for
approving the accomplice liability elements instruction where competent
counsel could have reasonably concluded that the instruction conveyed the
correct mental state either by itself or when read with the other instructions?
2. Has Defendant established that his counsel was ineffective for
allowing the jury to have access to Defendant’s police interview during their
deliberations?
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Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1,¶16, 247
P.3d 344.
3. Did the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprive Defendant of
a fair trial?
Standard of Review. This Court “will reverse only if the cumulative effect
of the several errors undermines [its] confidence … that a fair trial was had.”
State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶78, 387 P.3d 618 (citing State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)) (omission in original).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.1
Jesse Rakes, Michael Polk, and Defendant drove together to the Rio
Grande area of Salt Lake City in Polk’s PT Cruiser and parked. R773. When
Rakes saw Victim’s Dodge Challenger, he planned for the three men to steal
it by pretending that the PT Cruiser needed a jump-start. Id.; State’s Exhibit
(SE)11 (8:55-16:04). Defendant’s part in the robbery was perpetuating Rakes’s
ruse by pretending to look for jumper cables and threatening Victim with a
gun. R845,848-51.

The facts are recited “in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.’
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,117 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted).
1

-4-

*****
Victim and Girlfriend were homeless and lived in Victim’s Dodge
Challenger with their two dogs and all their possessions. R631. Early one the
morning, Victim and Girlfriend drove to the Rio Grande area so Girlfriend
could buy heroin. R551, 581. Before she could, Rakes approached their car
and asked Victim to jump-start the PT Cruiser. R554. Victim agreed. R555.
Victim moved his Dodge Challenger, parked it “nose-to-nose” with the
PT Cruiser, and popped the hood. R556. Rakes then popped the hood of the
PT Cruiser. R636. As Defendant and Polk pretended to look for jumper cables,
Victim stood on the passenger side of his car chatting with Rakes. R556-57,
772.
Victim noticed that Defendant and Polk were taking a long time to find
the cables and asked Rakes about it. R557. In response, Rakes pulled up his
shirt, showed Victim his gun, and told Victim, “You know what this is. We
are taking everything,.” R560, Tell your bitch to get out of the car or I’m going
to pistol whip her.” R534,557-58. Defendant stood side-by-side with Rakes
and showed his gun to Victim. R558.
Rakes pointed his gun at Victim and chased him around the Dodge
Challenger. R562. In self-defense, Victim shot Rakes. R563. Rakes staggered
to the middle of the street and fell over, unconscious. R564.
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Victim and Girlfriend tried to drive to safety. R563-64. But before
Victim could shut the driver’s side door, Polk, driving the PT Cruiser, hit their
car twice, causing the PT Cruiser to flip onto its roof. R563-65; SE 4, 5, 10.
Victim and Girlfriend then drove their damaged car around the corner,
tossed their gun and bullets, and waited for police. R566; SE 10.
After Rakes was shot, Defendant ran. R603, 714; SE 8, 9. An officer saw
Defendant “walking at a quicker than normal pace” several blocks from the
Rio Grande area. R712. The officer stopped Defendant because he matched a
witness’s description. Id. When the officer asked Defendant if he had been
near the Rio Grande area, Defendant denied it. R716. He told the officer that
he “did not shoot anybody” and he did not “see anybody get shot.” R719.
Defendant was interviewed again at the police station and that
interview was videotaped. SE 11. Defendant told the detective that he
“[d]idn’t see nothing,” but “heard the sirens” and “heard a shot.” R752; SE 11
(00:34-1:14).
After the detective told Defendant that Polk “put him in the car” and
that Polk, Victim, and Girlfriend gave statements, Defendant gave a different
story. R752, 756; SE 11 (1:14-1:60, 2:31, 5:46-7:39). Defendant told the detective
that Victim asked for a jump-start and that Victim shot Rakes. R756; SE 11
(2:31-3:23,5:46-7:39). Defendant said that he then ran from the scene. R756; SE
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11 (2:31-3:23,5:46-7:39). Defendant admitted that he was at the trunk of the PT
Cruiser looking for jumper cables and he approached the passenger side of
the car, where Victim and Rakes were standing. SE 11 (2:31-3:20, 5:46-7:39).
Defendant denied that either he or Rakes had a gun. SE 11 (7:28-7:30).
Defendant said that was “all [he] knew.” SE 11 (3:18-3:22).
The detective then told Defendant that Rakes died. R763; SE 11 (7:4216:04). Defendant told a third story. R763; SE 11 (7:42-16:04). According to
Defendant, it was Rakes’s idea to steal Victim’s car. R765-67, 775; SE 11 (8:5516:04). Defendant explained that Rakes “decided to [] pretend” the PT Cruiser
needed a jump-start and asked Victim for one. SE 11 (9:37-9:50); R765-67.
Defendant acknowledged that he knew Rakes’ jump-start story was a ruse
but admitted that he went along with it by pretending to look for jumper
cables. R765-66, 772; SE 11 (9:10-14:36). According to Defendant, Victim
moved his car nose-to-nose with the PT Cruiser and stood on the passenger
side of the Challenger with Rakes. SE 11 (11:20-15:18). Defendant walked up
to Rakes and Victim, heard Rakes say “something” to Victim. R764, 773; SE
11 (8:55-15:21). Defendant then saw Rakes chase Victim around Dodge
Challenger and Victim shot Rakes. R764, 773; SE 11 (8:55-15:21). Defendant
said that after he heard a gunshot, he walked away. R769, 773; SE 8, 9, 11
(13:15-13:59).
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Although the video showed Defendant’s multiple versions of events
and incriminating admissions, it also showed Defendant tell the detective
that he did not have a gun, he tried to talk Rakes out of stealing the car, and
there was not a plan to steal the car. R768; SE 11 (9:10-16:04).
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
Defendant was charged as an accomplice to aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony. R66-68.
At trial, the parties agreed to give the jury three accomplice liability
instructions: one quoting the language of the accomplice liability statute,
Instruction 39, (R226); one setting forth the elements of accomplice liability,
Instruction 40, (R227); and one defining the term accomplice, Instruction 41,
(R228). R540. The trial court approved the instructions. Id.
The State supported its case with the testimony of Victim, (R547);
Girlfriend, (630); the officer who saw Defendant walking quickly, (666); and
the detective who interviewed Defendant, (R727); a surveillance video of the
PT Cruiser repeatedly ramming Victim’s car, (SE10); photos taken from
surveillance videos of Defendant leaving the scene, (SE8,9); and Defendant’s
videotaped police interview, (SE11). The State argued that Defendant acted
as an accomplice to aggravated robbery in two ways: when he pretended to
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look for jumper cables and when he threatened Victim with a gun. R845, 84851.
During the State’s case-in-chief, the jury watched Defendant’s
videotaped police interview and the video was entered into evidence. R751;
SE 11. Defense counsel stipulated to both. R751, 799, 875; see also R248.
The video was approximately twenty-three-minutes long, but at trial,
the State played only about the first seventeen minutes of it. R750-73; SE 11.
The portion played showed the detective Mirandizing Defendant,
questioning Defendant, and Defendant’s multiple stories. R750-73; SE 11
(00:34-16:04). However, the State did not present the last seven minutes of the
video that showed the detective telling Defendant that he was calling the
district attorney, handcuffing Defendant, and photographing Defendant.
R880; SE 6, 7, 11.
After closing argument, the trial court asked both parties to make sure
that it had all the exhibits that needed to go to the jury room. R870-71. The
court also asked the parties to provide a laptop for the jury to watch the video
evidence. R870-71. Defense counsel did not object to the jury having access to
any of the exhibits during its deliberations, including the video exhibit of
Defendant’s police interview. Id.
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Defendant did not testify at trial, but he called two witnesses: an
eyewitness that saw Victim shoot Rakes and Defendant running away, R80109; and the officer who initially interviewed Victim, R809-20. Defendant also
based his defense on cross-examination of the State’s witnesses and his
videotaped police interview. R579-621, 649-63, 778-94. Defendant argued that
he did not participate in the crime, that he actively tried to dissuade Rakes
from committing the crime, and he challenged Victim and Girlfriend’s
credibility. R853-61.
At some point during its deliberations, the jury asked for the video
evidence and it was provided—including the video of Defendant’s police
interview. R872-73. The jury watched the interview video, but it is unknown
how much of it the jury watched. R874. About twenty minutes after the jury
requested the video evidence, defense counsel alerted the trial court that he
had not intended for the video of Defendant’s police interview to go back to
the jury room. R782-73. The bailiff removed the laptop from the jury room,
but the jury had already watched at least some of the video. R874.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. R873-78. The court took the
motion under advisement pending the jury verdict. R878. After the jury
found Defendant guilty as charged, the trial court ordered briefing. R883-84,
878-79.
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After oral argument and briefing, the trial court denied Defendant’s
mistrial motion. R240-42, 248-53, 257-60, 913-15. The court found that the jury
should not have viewed the interview during deliberations, but any error was
harmless. R259. The court explained that Defendant had not shown
harmlessness because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s guilty verdict even without the video. Id. The court also explained that
Defendant would have benefitted from any undue weight the jury may have
given the video, the jury only had access to the video for twenty minutes, and
the jury did not have the ability to repeatedly view the testimony during
deliberations. R259-60.
The trial court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of
ten years to life. R926. Defendant timely appealed. R269.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the inclusion of the accomplice liability elements instruction,
Instruction 40. In support, Defendant argues that the instruction was
incorrect because it did not specifically require the jury to find that Defendant
had the intent to facilitate the commission of an aggravated robbery.
Defendant’s claim fails because he cannot show either deficient
performance or prejudice. Defendant cannot show that his counsel’s
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performance was constitutionally deficient where the instruction, whether
read alone or with the other two accomplice liability instructions, properly
instructed the jury that Defendant must possess the culpable mental state of
the principal crime. For this same reason, Defendant cannot show prejudice.
He also cannot show prejudice because ample evidence supported the
verdict.
Point II. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed
the jury to view his videotaped police interview during deliberations. At trial,
Defendant did not object to the jury taking the video during deliberations.
However, after the jury watched at least some of the video during its
deliberations, Defendant moved for a mistrial on this ground. Defendant
argues his mistrial motion preserved his claim. Alternatively, Defendant
argues that his counsel was ineffective.
To preserve a claim of error, a defendant must make a timely objection.
Defendant’s objection was not timely. Defendant’s mistrial motion was made
after the alleged error occurred, depriving the trial court of the opportunity
to timely address the issue at trial, before jury deliberations, or before the
video was sent back to the jury room. His mistrial motion, therefore, did not
preserve his claim.
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Thus, to prevail, Defendant must show that his counsel was ineffective.
On this record, Defendant cannot prove either deficient performance or
prejudice. Defendant cannot prove that all competent counsel would have
objected to the jury re-watching the video of his police interview during
deliberations because the interview is the only evidence supporting that
Defendant attempted to stop the carjacking, that Rakes’s plan to steal Victim’s
car was not mutual, and that Defendant did not have a gun. Nor can
Defendant show prejudice where ample evidence supported his conviction
and his argument was speculative.
Point III. Defendant argues that this Court should reverse on
cumulative error. His claim fails because there was no error, let alone
cumulative error.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HIS COUNSEL
PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY BY APPROVING THE
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION
Defendant argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently for not
objecting to the accomplice liability elements instruction, Instruction 40.
Br.Aplt.15-29. Defendant argues that his counsel should have objected to
Instruction 40 because, he says, it omitted the required mental state that he
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intended to aid the commission of an aggravated robbery. Br.Aplt.15-23. This,
Defendant argues, means the jury could have convicted him of being an
accomplice to the aggravated robbery even though he only intended to aid
the commission of a lesser crime. Br.Aplt.15-23. But a competent attorney
could have concluded that Instruction 40 alone or the instructions as a whole,
especially read in light of the evidence, adequately conveyed the correct
mental state requirement. And read in light of the evidence, there is no
reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted without finding that Defendant
intended to aid the commission of an aggravated robbery.
To show that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove that
his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984); State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, ¶19, 12 P.3d 92. Defendant must prove both elements. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Under Strickland, it is never enough to “show that
counsels’ performance could have been better” or that it “might have
contributed to [a] conviction.” State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258–59 (Utah
1993). Instead, Defendant must show “actual unreasonable representation and
actual prejudice.” Id. 1259 (emphasis in original). This standard is “highly
demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). And
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“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
A. Defendant has not proven deficient performance.
To show deficient performance under Strickland, Defendant must show
that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. “[T]rial counsel’s error must be so egregious
that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted similarly.” Harvey
v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). This Court’s
review of counsel’s performance thus begins with a “strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).
The Strickland standard of objective reasonableness demands that
“judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance” be “highly deferential.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Because there are a “variety of circumstances faced
by defense counsel” in any given case counsel must be given “wide latitude”
to choose between a “range of legitimate decisions,” frequently in the heat of
trial. Id.; see State v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, ¶25, 262 P.3d 1 (“[A]n attorney’s job is
to act quickly, under pressure, with the best information available.”). After
all, there is rarely “one [right] technique or approach” in a given situation.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011). “Even the best criminal defense
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attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689.
Accordingly, the purpose of the deficiency inquiry “is not to grade
counsel’s performance” or determine whether counsel made the best or most
reasonable choice. Id. 697. Rather, it is to determine whether counsel’s “acts
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance” given “the facts of the particular case.” Id. 690.
A defendant bears the heavy burden of overcoming the “strong
presumption” of reasonableness by “identify[ing] the acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. He then must show that counsel’s actions “amounted to
incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
At bottom, a defendant must prove that “no competent attorney”
would have done what his attorney did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124
(2011). Consequently, a defendant cannot prevail merely by showing that a
reasonable alternative choice, even a “more reasonable or effective” one,
could have been implemented, so long as the choice actually made was
reasonable. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶¶41, 43, 328 P.3d 841, abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016; see also Roe v.
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Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (the Sixth Amendment “imposes one
general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices”).
An appellate court’s “highly deferential” review, therefore, “must
judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct” and “from
counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90. It must not
“second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,” but
must make “every effort…to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id.
689. Indeed, the “Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not
perfect advocacy judge with the benefit of hindsight.” Yarborough v. Gentry,
540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam). And again, “counsel is strongly presumed
to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
Defendant has failed to overcome this presumption and show deficient
performance. Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by
approving Instruction 40 because it did not explain that he needed to possess
the culpable mental state of aggravated robbery. Br.Aplt.15-23. But a
competent attorney could have concluded that Instruction 40 alone or the
instructions as a whole, especially read in light of the evidence, adequately
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conveyed the correct mental state requirement. Thus, Defendant has not
shown that no competent attorney would have approved the instruction.
Jury instructions “must accurately and adequately inform a criminal
jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged.” State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,
3 (Utah App. 1993). Even when jury instructions are assessed for technical
correctness, they “cannot be viewed in isolation.” State v. Lambdin, 2017 UT
46, ¶50, 424 P.3d. 117. Instructions “must be evaluated as a whole to
determine their adequacy.” State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶13, 18 P.3d 1123.
Thus, this Court “‘will affirm when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly
tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions,
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have been.’” Id.
(citations omitted); accord State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶18, 132 P.3d 703.
When reviewing jury instructions within the context of an
ineffectiveness claim, however, Defendant also carries his burden of proving
deficient performance. See State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶22–25, 318 P.3d 1164.
And that requires more than merely showing that his attorney could have
secured “better” instructions. See Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶¶41, 43 (defendant
cannot show deficient performance by pointing to an alternative, possibly
more reasonable choice, so long as choice actually employed was reasonable);
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258 (“it is not enough [to] show that counsels’ performance
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could have been better”). Indeed, there has likely never been a case where an
attorney could not have done something better. For that reason, the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee perfect counsel, only a reasonably
competent one. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 24 (2013); Richter, 562 U.S. at 110.
Here, Defendant has not shown his counsel performed deficiently by
approving Instruction 40. A competent attorney could have concluded that
Instruction 40 adequately conveyed the correct mental state requirement.
Instruction 40 provided:
A person can commit a crime as a “party.” In other words, a
person can commit a criminal offense even though that person
did not personally do all of the acts that make up the offense. If
you find beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the defendant intentionally,
(2) solicited, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided
another to commit the offense, AND
(3) the offense was committed,
then you can find the defendant guilty of that offense.
R227 (emphasis in original).
Although aggravated robbery was not expressly identified in the
instruction, on this record, there could be no confusion that “the offense”
referred to aggravated robbery. Indeed, Defendant was only charged with
one crime—aggravated robbery. R222. And the jury was instructed that to
find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, it had to find that beyond a
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reasonable doubt, that Defendant “as a party to the offense unlawfully and
intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence against his will by means of
force or fear, with the purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently
or temporarily of the personal property; and [] that in the course of
committing these acts as a party: used or threatened to use a dangerous
weapon; or took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle.” R222
(instruction 35). In short, the instructions informed the jury that it had to find
that Defendant “intentionally” committed aggravated robbery to find him
guilty as an accomplice. Id; R227. Given these instructions, competent counsel
could have reasonably concluded that Instruction 40 adequately conveyed
the required mental state.
Additionally, competent counsel would not object to Instruction 40
because the other instructions clarify any possible confusion. The jury was
given two other accomplice liability instructions in addition to Instruction 40.
Instruction 39 (statutory instruction) provided:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense,
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
R226.
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Instruction 41 (definition instruction) provided:
Prior knowledge that a crime is about to be committed or is
being committed does not make a person an accomplice, and
thereby does not subject them to criminal prosecution unless the
person has the mental state required to commit the crime and he
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids in
the perpetration of the crime.
Further, his mere presence at the crime scene does not in
itself subject him to criminal prosecution for any crime, unless
you find beyond a reasonable doubt he possessed the mental
state required to commit the crime and he acted in such a manner
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided in the perpetration of the crime.
If, on the other hand, you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether the defendant possessed the mental state required to
commit the crime or whether he solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in the
perpetration of the crime(s), you must find him not guilty of the
charge.
R228.
In State v. Augustine, Augustine was charged as an accomplice to
attempted murder. 2013 UT App 61, ¶10, 298 P.3d 693. The accomplice
liability instruction at his trial quoted the accomplice liability statute, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 “word-for-word.” Id. ¶10. A separate instruction
informed the jury that to convict Augustine of attempted murder, it had to
find that he “intentionally attempted to cause the death of another person.”
Id. This Court held that an instruction that quoted the accomplice liability
statute, together with a correct instruction on the mental state element of the
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charged crime, correctly instructed the jury on accomplice liability. See 2013
UT App 61, ¶¶8-10. This Court explained that the statutory language “clearly
indicate[d] that a requirement of accomplice liability is that the accomplice
“‘act[ ] with the mental state required for the … offense.’” Id. ¶10 (quoting
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-202) (alteration in original). This Court, therefore,
held that the language of the accomplice liability statute, coupled with the
element instruction on attempted murder, “adequately explained” the “mens
rea required for accomplice liability.” Id.
And in State v. Clark, this Court reiterated its holding in Augustine. 2014
UT App 56, ¶55, 322 P.3d 761. In Clark, Clark was charged with, among other
things, as an accomplice to aggravated robbery. Id. ¶¶7, 52, 56. The
accomplice liability instruction at his trial quoted section 76-2-202 and a
separate instruction detailed the aggravated robbery elements, including the
required mental state. Id. ¶55. This Court held that the instructions
“accurately and adequately informed the jury as to accomplice liability when
read and evaluated as a whole.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Like Augustine and Clark, the jury instructions, in this case, were
equally clear. Instruction 39 quoted the accomplice liability statute verbatim,
thus, it likewise “clearly indicate[d]” that the jury could not convict
Defendant without first finding that he “act[ed] with the mental state
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required for the” offenses with which he was charged. See Augustine, 2013 UT
App 61, ¶10 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202). Instructions 40 and 41
then explained accomplice liability further. Instruction 40 explained that
Defendant could only be found guilty if the jury believed that he intentionally
acted as an accomplice when committing “the offense”—referring the jury
back to the aggravated robbery instruction. See R227. Instruction 41
repeatedly instructed the jury that Defendant could only be found guilty if
he had “the mental state required” to commit aggravated robbery and he
acted as an accomplice. See R228. And because the aggravated robbery
elements instruction explained the requisite mental state, the instructions as
a whole adequately explained the mental state required for accomplice
liability. See R222 (instruction 35); Augustine, 2013 UT App 61, ¶10. Thus,
Defendant cannot show his counsel was deficient for not objecting to the
instruction because when the three accomplice liability instructions are read
together, they indicated that accomplice liability requires that the accomplice
“‘act[ ] with the mental state required for the … offense.’” Augustine, 2013 UT
App 61, ¶10 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202) (alteration in original).
But even if Instruction 40 could have been more “full or accurate,” that
is not sufficient to show error, let alone deficient performance. See Lee, 2014
UT App 4, ¶23. Again, the question here is not whether the instructions were
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erroneous, but whether no competent counsel would have approved them.
Because the instructions when read together correctly stated the law, it was
objectively reasonable for counsel to not object to the instructions as given.
In arguing the contrary, Defendant argues that because Instruction 40
is identical to the erroneous accomplice liability instruction in State v. Jeffs,
2010 UT 49, 243 P.3d 1250 and State v. Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46, 424 P.3d
990, his counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to its inclusion.
Br.Aplt.16-23,24. Defendant’s reliance on Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, and Grunwald,
2018 UT App 46, is misplaced.
In Jeffs, Jeffs was convicted of two counts of rape as an accomplice. Jeffs,
2010 UT 49, ¶1. On appeal, Jeffs claimed that the accomplice liability
instruction at his trial was erroneous. The supreme court agreed, holding that
the instruction was inadequate because it “only indicated” that the “mental
state attached to the actions of ‘solicited, requested, commanded, or
encouraged,’ not to the underlying criminal conduct of rape.” Id. ¶42.
In Grunwald, Grunwald was convicted of eleven counts as an
accomplice, including aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder,
and aggravated robbery. 2018 UT App 46, ¶¶1, 19. On appeal, Grunwald
argued that her counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the accomplice
liability jury instructions because the instructions allowed her to be convicted

-24-

as an accomplice even if she did not possess the mental state of the principal
offense. Id. ¶¶33-36. This Court agreed with Grunwald that her counsel
performed deficiently by not objecting, but held that she had not proven her
counsel was ineffective because she did not prove prejudice. Id. ¶¶42, 50-58.
In Jeffs and Grunwald, the accomplice liability instructions only
included the erroneous accomplice liability elements instruction. Neither
case included the additional accomplice liability statute or definition
instructions, as is the case here. Jeffs and Grunwald are therefore inapplicable.
See 2010 UT 49, ¶41; 2018 UT App 46, ¶31.
Thus, Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption of
reasonableness. Nor has he established “actual unreasonable representation.”
See Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis in original); accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687–89. This Court should deny Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim for this
reason alone.
B. Defendant has not proven prejudice.
Defendant argues that there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have acquitted him but for the omitted mental state language in
Instruction 40. Br.Aplt.26-30.
To prove prejudice, Defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable
probability” that but for counsel’s performance, “the result of the proceeding
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would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. Proof of prejudice “must be a demonstrable reality,” not mere
speculation. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Errors that have
an “isolated” or “trivial effect” on the verdict are not prejudicial. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695-96. Thus, even where a jury instruction is erroneous, the error
may nevertheless be harmless in light of the evidence. See State v. Hutchings,
2012 UT 50, ¶¶24-28, 285 P.3d 1183.
For essentially the same reasons Defendant fails to show all competent
counsel would have objected to Instruction 40, he fails to show prejudice.
Instruction 40, whether read alone or with the other instructions, adequately
conveyed the correct mental state to the jury.
Additionally, on this record, there is no reasonable likelihood that
Defendant would have been acquitted but for counsel’s alleged error of
including Instruction 40. To prevail, Defendant must show that there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result if the jury had been correctly
instructed. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ¶¶21-23, 154 P.3d 788. When
assessing whether this is so, this Court must “‘consider the totality of the
evidence’” that was before the jury. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶28 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). This Court must also “‘review the record facts in

-26-

a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.’” Id. ¶26 (quoting State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, ¶2, 10 P.3d 346). When assessing those facts, this Court “can rely
on the presumption that the jury disbelieved the evidence in conflict with the
jury verdict . . . .” State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ¶25, 167 P.3d 1074; see also
Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶26.
In Grunwald, the erroneous jury instruction was not prejudicial because
the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that Grunwald acted with the
required mental state. 2018 UT App 46, ¶¶49-54. Thus, Grunwald had not
proven ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel’s deficient
performance did not prejudice her. Id. ¶75.
State v. Apodaca provides another example of a harmless jury
instruction error. See 2018 UT App 131, 428 P.3d 99. The jury instructions
erroneously allowed the jury to convict Apodaca of aggravated robbery as an
accomplice if he acted knowingly instead of intentionally. Id.¶76. On appeal,
Apodaca argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
aggravated robbery instruction. Id. ¶68. This Court held that the inclusion of
the erroneous jury instruction was not prejudicial because the evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrated that Apodaca acted with the required
intentional mental state. Id. ¶¶79-83. Thus, Apodaca’s counsel was not
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ineffective because he had not proven the prejudice element of Strickland v.
Washington. Id. ¶84.
So too here. The objective evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that
Defendant acted with the require intentional mental state.
At trial, the State presented Victim, Girlfriend, and police testimony,
video surveillance of the PT Cruiser flipping over, photos of Defendant
leaving the scene, and Defendant’s videotaped police interview. R558-60,
637-38; SE 8-11. Both Victim and Girlfriend testified that Defendant looked
for jumper cables—perpetuating Rakes’s ruse. R559, 637-38. And Victim
testified that Defendant also threatened him with a gun. R558, 560. Victim
and Girlfriend’s accounts never changed. See R863.
The jury saw Defendant’s police interview where Defendant gave
multiple stories—at first denying any knowledge and finally admitting to the
plan and his participation. R716-19, 752, 756, 763-775; SE11 (00:34-16:04).
Defendant’s videotaped police interview corroborated much of Victim and
Girlfriend’s testimony. During the interview, Defendant admitted that the
Victim moved his car nose-to-nose with the PT Cruiser, Victim stood on the
passenger side in between the cars, and Rakes chased Victim. SE 11 (8:5516:04). Defendant admitted that he knew that Rakes wanted Victim’s car and
planned to isolate Victim by asking him for a jump-start. Id. Defendant
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admitted that he went along with Rakes’s ruse by pretending to look for
jumper cables. Id. And Defendant admitted that he did not walk away from
the robbery. Id. Thus, objective evidence showed that Defendant intentionally
participated in Rakes’s plan.
Despite this, Defendant argues that the jury heard “compelling
evidence upon which they could have doubted” Defendant’s guilt.
Br.Aplt.26. Defendant argues that the evidence did not support that there was
a mutual plan to rob Defendant, Defendant wanted to take part in the crime,
or Victim was credible. Br.Aplt. 26-28. But the jury heard all of the evidence—
including the evidence Defendant points to—and convicted anyway.
Defendant also argues that the jury “could perhaps conclude” that
Defendant acted “recklessly.” Br.Aplt.28. But the jury was never instructed
on the reckless mental state. R205-29. Indeed, the only mental state the jury
was instructed on was intentionally. R215. Without an instruction, Defendant
cannot show that the jury would have relied on the wrong mental state to
convict.
Thus, Defendant has not—and cannot—show but for counsel’s alleged
error, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have acquitted
him.
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II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HIS COUNSEL
PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY BY NOT OBJECTING TO THE
JURY RE-WATCHING THE VIDEO OF HIS POLICE INTERVIEW
DURING DELIBERATIONS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his mistrial
motion because he was prejudiced by the jury re-watching the video of his
police interview during its deliberations. Br.Aplt.32-39.
The trial court agreed with Defendant that the jury should not have
viewed the interview during deliberations, but denied his motion because
any error was harmless. R259. The court explained that any error was
harmless because the State presented ample evidence to support the jury’s
guilty verdict. Id. The court also explained that Defendant would have
benefitted from any undue weight the jury may have given the video, the jury
only had access to the video for twenty minutes, and the jury did not have
the ability to repeatedly view the testimony during deliberations. R259-60.
Although Defendant did not object before the jury requested the video
evidence—and re-watched at least a portion of the interview video, he argues
that his mistrial motion sufficed to preserve an objection; alternatively,
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not preventing the
videotaped interview from “stay[ing] out of the jury room,” in the first
instance. Br.Aplt.32-39.
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But Defendant’s after-the-fact mistrial motion was too late to preserve
his claim of error. He can therefore prevail only if he proves both Strickland
elements: deficient performance and prejudice. 466 U.S. at 697. On this
record, Defendant cannot prove either element.
A. Defendant’s claim is unpreserved.
Defendant argues that his claim is preserved because the trial court
ruled on his mistrial motion. Br.Aplt.37. Defendant is incorrect.
The purpose of the preservation rule is “two-fold.” State v. Larrabee,
2013 UT 70, ¶15, 321 P.3d 1136. First, preservation affords the trial court “’an
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it,’”
”thereby promoting judicial economy.” Id. And second, it prevents
“defendants from foregoing an objection ‘with the strategy of enhancing the
defendant’s chances of acquittal and then if that strategy fails … claiming on
appeal that the court should reverse,’ thereby encouraging fairness.” Id.
(alteration in original).
To preserve a claim, a defendant must make a timely objection. Id. ¶16.
An objection is not timely if it is made after the alleged error has occurred. Id.
In Larrabee, Larrabee’s motion to arrest judgment made two months after the
trial concluded was not timely. Id. Larrabee’s after-the-fact motion did not
preserve his claims. Id. The supreme court explained that allowing
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defendants to preserve a claim in an after-the-fact motion like a motion to
arrest judgment “directly contradict[s] the purposes of the preservation rule.”
Id. The court explained that an after-the-fact motion is insufficient to preserve
an issue because it deprives the trial court of any opportunity to timely
address the issue at trial, allowing defendants to strategically forgo objecting
without the risk of losing their ability to appeal that issue. Id.
In State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶50, 428 P.3d 1052, Fullerton’s objection
was not preserved because he raised it for the first time in a motion to arrest
judgment. The supreme court explained that an objection not made during
trial is “not timely if it is filed in a post-trial motion.” Id. ¶49.
Like in Larrabee and Fullerton, Defendant’s objection was untimely.
Although Defendant had many opportunities to object to the jury rewatching the video of his police interview during its deliberations, he did not
do so.
For example, Defendant did not object to the video being admitted as
an exhibit—he instead stipulated to its admission. R735. Nor did Defendant
object or bring the video to the court’s attention at the close of the State’s case
when the State informed the court that it had all the evidence. R799.
Defendant did not object when the trial court asked both parties to ensure
that all the exhibits the jury should have access to during its deliberations
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were compiled. R870-71. He did not object when the trial court asked the
parties to examine the laptop the jury would presumably use to watch the
video evidence, including the video of Defendant’s police interview. Id. And
he did not object when the jury requested the video evidence and the video
of his interview was sent back to the jury room. R873.
To preserve his claim, Defendant should have either (1) at the time the
State moved to admit the video into evidence, objected; (2) at the time the trial
court asked the parties to make sure it had all of the exhibits for the jury to
access during its deliberations, moved to exclude the video under Rule 17 (k),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or (3) before the jury was excused to
deliberate, moved to exclude the video under Rule 17 (k). Rule 17 (k) allows
the jury to “take with them …all exhibits which have been received as
evidence except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in
possession of the jury.” But Defendant did none of this.
Defendant’s after-the-fact mistrial motion deprived the trial court of
the opportunity to address the issue during trial, before the video was given
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to the jury during their deliberations. Thus, his objection was untimely. See
Larrabee, 2018 UT 70, ¶¶15-16. Defendant’s claim is therefore not preserved.2
B. Defendant has not proven prejudice.
Because Defendant’s claim is not preserved, he must prove that his
counsel was ineffective for not preventing the jury from re-watching the
video of his police interview during their deliberations. Br.Aplt.37-38.
As explained, to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant
carries the heavy burden of proving that counsel performed deficiently.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. He must also affirmatively prove “actual
prejudice” resulting from counsel’s deficient performance. Tyler, 850 P.2d at
1259.And where, as here, “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670.
Defendant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by the jury re-watching
the video of his police interview because there was no reasonable likelihood

Even if preserved, however, Defendant’s claim still fails. First,
Defendant affirmatively waived any objection, thus he is foreclosed from
“taking advantage of an error committed at trial” because he “led the trial
court into committing the error.” State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶54, 70 P.3d
111 (defendant cannot take advantage of an error when he led the trial court
into committing the error). In any event, as explained below, Defendant’s
claim fails because he cannot show harm. See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,
¶¶46-47, 27 P.3d 1133 (defendant must show “that there is a substantial
likelihood that the jury would have found him not guilty”).
2
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that the jury would have acquitted him if it had not re-watched the video. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. As shown in Point I, ample evidence supported
Defendant’s intention to aid Rakes in the commission of an aggravated
robbery. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (in assessing whether a defendant has
carried his burden, a reviewing court “must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury.”).
At trial, the State presented Victim’s and Girlfriend’s testimony, photos
of Defendant leaving the scene, and Defendant’s videotaped police interview.
R558-560, 637-38; SE 8-11. Both Victim and Girlfriend testified that
Defendant’s role in the robbery was to perpetuate the ruse by searching for
jumper cables. R558, 637-38. Victim testified that Defendant threatened him
with his gun. R558-59. Victim and Girlfriend’s accounts never changed. R863.
The jury watched Defendant’s police interview during trial, including his
multiple versions of events and his last story where he admitted looking for
jumper cables fully knowing that he was aiding Rakes in the carjacking. SE
11 (2:31-16:04).
Despite this evidence, Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the
jury re-watching the video of his police interivew because (1) the multiple
versions of events he gave during the interview “could” have caused the jury
to question his credibility; (2) the jury was “likely” exposed to video content
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it had not seen at trial including Defendant in handcuffs; (3) the jury “likely”
gave undue weight to the video; and (4) the fact the jury returned a verdict
soon after requesting the video “suggests” that re-watching it influenced the
jury verdict. Br.Aplt.35-36.
Defendant’s claim fails because it is speculative. “[P]roof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a
demonstrable reality.” Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. Speculation “cannot
substitute for proof of prejudice.” State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah
1996). Defendant’s argument rests entirely on conjecture. He provides no
evidence that re-watching the videotape influenced the jury at all. Without
such supporting evidence and analysis, Defendant has not—and cannot—
prove prejudice. See Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 (Defendant “has the difficult
burden of showing…actual prejudice”) (emphasis in original).
Regardless, Defendant argues that re-watching the video may have
caused the jury to question his credibility because the video showed him
telling multiple stories. Br.Aplt.33. But the jury already saw this evidence
during trial. Thus, re-watching it was cumulative and unlikely to sway the
jury. See State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) (in hearsay context,
cumulative statements are harmless); State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶49, 387
P.3d 618 (no prejudice where jury watched CJC video during deliberations).
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Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced because the jury may
have watched footage not presented during trial of the detective handcuffing
him and telling him he would “probably go to jail for robbery.” Br.Aplt.34.
As a threshold matter, there is no record evidence that the jury saw this part
of the video. See Arguelles, 921 P.2d at, 441 (speculation is not proof of
prejudice).
Relying on Lucas v. State, 791 S.W. 2d 35, 55-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989),
Defendant argues that the jury seeing him on video in handcuffs prejudiced
him. But Defendant’s reliance is misplaced. In Lucas, the court held that no
prejudice resulted when the jury watched a video of Lucas handcuffed at the
crime scene. 791 S.W. 2d at 55-56. The court explained that the jury viewing
Lucas handcuffed on video did not contribute to Lucas’s conviction because
Lucas was not handcuffed at trial, and the jury was instructed on the
presumption of innocence. Id.
Like Lucas, if the jury saw Defendant on video handcuffed inside a
police station, Defendant was not prejudiced. Defendant was not in restraints
during trial, and the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence.
R205. Moreover, it is common knowledge that individuals who are under
arrest

are

typically

handcuffed.

See,

e.g.,

Arrest,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrest last visited October 29, 2018 (photos
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of individuals under arrest in handcuffs). Thus, Defendant cannot show
prejudice.
The detective’s statement to Defendant that he “would probably go to
jail for robbery” does not change this calculus. Br.Aplt.34. If the jury saw this
part of the video, there is not a reasonable likelihood that Defendant would
have been acquitted because Defendant was charged with and on trial for
aggravated robbery. The statement did not provide the jury with any
information that they did not already know.
Defendant argues that it is “likely” that the jury gave undue weight to
the video and the record “suggests” that re-watching it influenced the verdict
because the jury returned a verdict soon after requesting the video.
Br.Aplt.35-36. At bottom, Defendant asks this Court to intrude into the jury’s
deliberative process by speculating on how the jury perceived and weighed
the evidence. Such intrusion is prohibited. Jessop v. Hardman, 2014 UT App
28, ¶26, 319 P.3d 790 (citation omitted); see Utah R. Evid. 606(b) (prohibiting
jurors from testifying or giving statement “about any statement made or
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.”).
Jury “decision-making is designed to be a black box: the inputs
(evidence and argument) are carefully regulated by law, and the output (the
verdict) is publicly announced, but the inner workings and deliberation of
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the jury are deliberately insulated from subsequent review.” Jessop, 2014 UT
App 28, ¶26 (citation omitted). As this Court explained, the rule protecting
jury deliberations “insulates …the jury from subsequent second-guessing by
the judiciary.” Jessop, 2014 UT App 28, ¶26. This Court recognized that this
“approach may seem to offend the search for perfect justice,” but explained
that if “what went on in the jury room were judicially reviewable for
reasonableness or fairness, trials would no longer truly be by jury, as the
Constitution commands,” because “[f]inal authority would be exercised by
whomever is empowered to decide whether the jury's decision was
reasonable enough, or based on proper considerations.” Id. ¶27 (quotation
omitted).
Because Defendant asks this Court to speculate on how the jury
weighed the evidence, his claim fails.
On this record, Defendant has not proven prejudice. See Tyler, 850 P.2d
at 1259 (defendant must show “actual prejudice” to prevail) (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). This, his ineffectiveness claim fails.
C. Defendant has not proven deficient performance.
Defendant argues his counsel performed deficiently because he did not
have a strategic reason for allowing the jury to re-watch his police interview
during its deliberations. Br.Aplt.39. In support, Defendant argues that trial
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counsel admitted that he did not have a strategic reason for the exhibit to go
to the jury room. Id. But Defendant’s reliance on strategy alone is misplaced.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “the relevant
question, in a deficient performance analysis “is not whether counsel’s
choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 481. A defendant who “persuad[es] the court that there was no
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions” has merely rebutted the
“strong presumption” that counsel rendered adequate assistance. State v.
Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 P.3d 162; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But rebutting
the presumption of reasonableness does not establish that counsel was in fact
objectively unreasonable—the standard announced by the Supreme Court.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–89 (“defendant must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”)
(emphasis added).
Thus, even if no definitive “strategy” can be identified, Defendant
cannot prevail unless he shows that counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 479 (Sixth Amendment “imposes
one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices”).
Counsel may perform reasonably even when his decision or action
proves to be erroneous. Strickland asks only “whether an attorney’s
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representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional
norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common
custom.” Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The
Sixth Amendment requires that counsel’s representation “be only objectively
reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill.” Dows v. Wood, 211
F.3d 480,487 (9th Cir.2000). Thus, counsel does not necessarily perform
deficiently even if he makes “minor mistakes” and appears “momentarily
confused during trial. Id. 487. Counsel’s performance is deficient under
Strickland, only when “no competent attorney” would have acted similarly.
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124; Harvey, 629 F.3d at 1239 (counsel is deficient only when
his “error is so egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have
acted similarly”).
Defendant has not shown that no competent attorney would have sent
his police interview back to the jury room. There “are countless ways to
provide effective assistance of counsel in any given case.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689. Although trial counsel here determined that the jury should not watch
the video during deliberations, another competent attorney may come to a
different decision. See id. (“Even the best criminal defense attorneys would
not defend a particular client in the same way.”). As the trial court explained,
“it was Defendant who would have benefitted from any undue weight the
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jury might have placed on [the video] based on repeated viewings.” R259.
Indeed, the video was the only evidence of Defendant’s story that he tried to
dissuade Rakes from committing the carjacking, that the carjacking had not
been the result of mutual plan, and that Defendant did not have a gun. SE 11
(9:10-16:04). Moreover, the video captured Defendant’s cooperation, remorse,
sincerity, and body language. Id.
Given these circumstances, Defendant cannot show that “no
competent attorney” would have acted similarly, or that no “competent
attorney” would have allowed the jury to re-watch the video during its
deliberations. See Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. Thus, Defendant cannot prove
deficient performance.
III.
CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT JUSTIFY OVERTURNING
THE JURY VERDICT
Defendant finally claims that this Court should reverse on cumulative
error, if nothing else. Br.Aplt.39-40. An appellate court reverses on
cumulative error only if errors are so pervasive and prejudicial that they
“undermine[] [this Court’s] confidence" in the essential fairness of the trial.
State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶363, 299 P.3d 892. Because there was no error,
there is no cumulative error. And even if there were any error, its impact was
de minimis, and would not have been collectively prejudicial.
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CONCLUSION
Summary of State’s position and statement of specific relief sought.
Respectfully submitted on November 15, 2018.
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